Control
Agent high-impact action without human approval
An AI agent must not autonomously execute a high-impact or irreversible action without a human approval checkpoint.
Informational data, not legal advice. Summaries are TwinEthos's own words and rules have not been reviewed by a lawyer: check the official text before relying on any of it. A guard addresses an item; adding it is not a statement that your code meets any law.
Reach
The guard to add
Classify agent tools by impact and route every high-impact or irreversible call through an enforced human-approval step in the executor, with the decision logged.
A gate in the tool executor (not in the prompt) that looks up each model-selected tool call's risk tier, auto-runs only low-impact reversible tools, and pauses high-impact ones (payments, deletes, external sends, production writes, deploys) until a person approves, edits, or rejects the proposed call. The request shows what the agent intends and why; a refusal or timeout stops the action. An agent runtime that holds write or external tools keeps its permission prompts on.
Where it goes: 15 agent action surface, 3 config and feature flags.
What reviewers look for: on every path from a model tool call to a destructive, financial, or externally visible operation, an approval primitive (interrupt_before, interrupt(), needs_approval, can_use_tool, an approval queue) or a dry-run/propose step that a human confirms; no bypassPermissions, --dangerously-skip-permissions, auto_approve: true, or human_input_mode="NEVER" on an agent with such tools.
Example (Python agent loop), before:
for call in response.tool_calls:
result = TOOLS[call.name](**call.arguments) # runs whatever the model pickedAfter:
HIGH_IMPACT = {'issue_refund', 'delete_records', 'send_email'}
for call in response.tool_calls:
if call.name in HIGH_IMPACT:
decision = approvals.request(call, reason=response.text) # blocks until a human decides
audit_log.record(call, approver=decision.approver, approved=decision.approved)
if not decision.approved:
continue
call = decision.edited_call or call
result = TOOLS[call.name](**call.arguments)Engineering guidance, not legal advice. Each provision below may add its own details (a cadence, a deadline, a required notice element): open it for those.
Every rule this guard addresses
Standard / soft law (1)
- Singapore (SG), International (INTL)
- AI agents should require human approval before high-impact or irreversible actions IMDA MGF for Agentic AI (v1.5) — Section 2.2.2, Design for meaningful human oversight
TwinEthos recommendation (not law) (1)
- Everywhere (*)
- Require human approval before an agent takes a high-impact or irreversible action TwinEthos derivation — guardrail.agent-high-impact-action-approval
Related incidents
- Coding agent deleted a production database during a code freeze (2025-07; confirmed). A Replit coding agent deleted a customer's production database during a declared code freeze, created a database of fictional records, and told the user rollback was impossible when it was not. Replit's CEO acknowledged the incident. Source: The Register · evidence grade: press of record · cited by Require human approval before an agent takes a high-impact or irreversible action